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The recently published Handbook on Feminist Engagement with International Law
[’the Handbook’] does not only provide a glimpse at the breadth of contemporary
critical feminist international law scholarship, but, perhaps more importantly,
it surveys potential futures for the field. In other words, it is not necessarily an
exercise in taking stock as much as it is one in contemplating different visions for
critical, feminist approaches to international law. This is a particularly important
endeavor at a time when feminists, while increasingly occupying governing positions
(in international law and elsewhere), are facing criticism for failing to achieve
the transformative potential of feminism. As Diane Otto puts it in the Afterword
to the Handbook: “We need to learn how to engage strategically with powerful
institutions without mistaking feminism’s uncanny institutional doubles for feminist
transformation”.
Based on the diverse visions presented by the Handbook contributors, the editors,
Kate Ogg and Susan Harris Rimmer, ‘deduce general future directions’ for the
field  and, more specifically, identify four overarching objectives: (1) diversifying
feminist engagement with international law; (2) making feminist engagement more
influential; (3) improving women’s lives; and (4) building bridges with other critical
theories. In light of the many shortcomings of contemporary theoretical and practical
(‘governance feminist’) approaches to international law, I argue that we need to put
particular emphasis on the fourth aspect: building bridges between feminism and
other critical theories. ‘Building bridges’ should be understood as intersectionality.
Taking an intersectional approach requires us, while still focusing on gender, to
recognize that gender always simultaneously takes on other identities such as race,
class, and religion. This does not only hold for theoretical, scholarly work but also for
activism/political decision-making. Only a ‘feminist’ approach to international law that
attempts to recognize the varied experience of women under international law can
truly exercise its full transformative potential.
The editors of the Handbook note at the outset that the past two decades have been
“the best and worst of times, in the truly Dickensian sense” for feminist international
law scholars. It is ‘the best of times’ because, as Janet Halley and her colleagues
have recently pointed out, feminists are no longer a “vox clamantis in deserto”.
Rather, as Halley observes, feminists are now in positions of power: ‘Governance
Feminism’, which they define as “every form in which feminists and feminist ideas
exert a governing will within human affairs” has become a reality. ‘Governance
Feminism’ is a purely descriptive, rather than normative, category: Many of its
achievements are to be welcomed and applauded, but the entry of feminists into
powerful positions in the international bureaucracy can also pose problems. ln fact,
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many prominent scholarly voices are critical of the particular kinds of feminism that
have gained influence in the realm of international law. In an interview with the
Voelkerrechtsblog in 2016, Hilary Charlesworth observed that the feminism that
has gained influence in international law is a “limited, fractured idea of feminism”.
She aptly compared the governing feminism(s) to ‘space food’: “pre-packaged,
powdered food” that astronauts take with them into space. Even though it is food, it
is drained of “all the moisture, they reduced it and [took] out much of the texture and
the freshness”. How can we ensure that governing feminism(s) are not reduced to
‘space food’-feminism(s)?
Janet Halley and her colleagues argue that the crux of the matter lies in the
kinds of feminism(s) that have found their way into international governance
institutions and are dominating them today. Along these lines, Karen Engle notes
that it is “commonsense narratives” based on liberal and structural bias feminist
understandings that led to the prevailing ‘carceral feminism’ in international
law today. Liberal feminists argue for the inclusion of women in international
law and suggest that such an inclusion is necessary and sufficient to achieve
gender equality. Structural bias feminists, on the other hand, emphasize sexual
subordination of women as the main vehicle of such subordination. Their objective
is to remedy said structural bias and overcome the structural discrimination of
women. The dominance, and limitations, of liberal and structural bias feminism
in international law seem to indeed provide at least a partial explanation for the
shortcomings of feminist approaches to international law in practice. The major early
critiques of these approaches came from Third World feminists. They challenged
the exclusion of Third World women’s experiences by (mostly Western) feminist
scholars and questioned the uniform representation of the category ‘woman’ and
their subordination as misunderstanding or ignorant of non-Western realities.
Western feminism was/is often seen as perpetuating colonial or neocolonial
ideas and agendas (Gayatri Spivak: “White men are saving brown women from
brown men”), which position women as victims, thereby negating their agency. As
Giovanna Maria Frisso points out in her contribution, the “single universal narrative
of struggle” developed out of the context of white, bourgeois women and as such
only furthers the continuous marginalisation of Third World women. In order to avoid
such longstanding shortcomings of mainstream feminism, it is crucial to adopt an
approach that routinely takes into account different social and political identities such
as race, gender, and religion. Only by adopting an intersectional feminist approach to
international law can we ensure that we are sensitive to the varied realities of women
and improve their everyday lives.
The Third World scholars’ charges do not, in my opinion, mean that Western
feminists should ignore non-Western societies and strictly mind their own business.
The contributions to the Handbook illustrate the importance of such studies, as
they can lead to surprising, and at times even contradictory conclusions about the
relationship between ‘culture’, international law and the everyday lives of women. In
her keynote speech (as printed in the Handbook), Sima Samar points to the example
of Afghanistan in which “[r]espect for religion and culture was used as an excuse not
to talk with or about women […] even with some humanitarian projects”. However,
culture is not immutable but rather highly dynamic – and often made by men. In
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another contribution, a case study of the Maputo Protocol on gender equality, Jing
Geng reveals that (African) culture and gender equality can be compatible and
even provide women “with a sense of ownership and agency in their advocacy for
the realisation of gender equality”. What these contributions show is not only that
engagement with non-Western contexts by Western feminists is possible but that it
is, in fact, warranted in order to build a shared, feminist agenda through which we
can uphold certain universal values such as gender equality.
Considering the commitment to universal values in international (human rights)
law, feminist approaches must pay particular attention to TWAIL (Third World
Approaches to International Law) and Third World feminist perspectives. In this
context, I do not consider Third World approaches to be applicable only to the
Global South: There is a Third World in the First World, and vice versa.  Importantly,
Frisso emphasizes that the category ‘Third World woman’ is aligned with anti-
essentialist critiques of international law in that it is a constructed and disputed
category that ‘embraces a normative perspective, which aims at making heard
various marginalised voices’. In fact, according to Frisso, only a Third World
perspective sufficiently recognizes Third World women’s agency and allows for the
discursive construction of a shared, feminist agenda. This provides an example of
how anti-essentialist scholars can adopt essentialist political positions, or at least
its terminology, while at the same time maintaining their theoretical anti-essentialist
position. So-called ‘strategic essentialism’ will likely remain necessary in international
(human rights) law. (Third World) women will remain dependent on ‘spokeswomen’
to advocate and speak for them (as ‘depictors’ or ‘proxies’) – even though we might
be convinced not only that the boundaries of the category ‘woman’ or ‘Third World
woman’ are fluid but also that its essence (’womanhood’) is (partially) fictitious.
Josephine Jarpa Dawuni illustrates this point in her contribution to the Handbook
in which she refers to ‘African women’: even though we know that there is no such
thing as “the experience of African women”, we can only begin to understand the
diversity of contributions to international law of women of African descent by focusing
on the contributions of individual women and the collective of African women.
While this kind of strategic essentialism might well be warranted in these contexts,
we have to reject ‘one-size-fits-all’ feminism – in theory and practice. Applying
multiple lenses and integrating other critical approaches into our analyses and our
governance strategies and activism enables us to identify previously neglected
areas in international law that have had a disproportionately negative impact on
Third World women (as opposed to the universal woman and as opposed to Third
World men). This is why, contrary to the concerns of some scholars, applying such
an approach not only to theoretical engagements but also to activism does not take
away from the power of feminist approaches but only enriches the positive impact on
women’s everyday lives.
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